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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------------------------------
JACK M. HELGESEN, ) ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) Case No. 17088 
vs. ) ) 
EKERETE I. INYANGUMIA, ) ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
-------------------------------------------
APPELLANT EKERETE I. INYANGUMIA'S BRIEF 
-------------------------------------------
NATURE OF CASE 
Respondent, Jack M. Helgesen, filed suit in the 
Second District Court in and for Weber County against 
Ekerete I. Inyangumia to recover damages allegedly incurred 
in an automobile accident which occurred on October 12, 1978. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A Default Judgment was entered against defendant-
appellant and the District Court denied the defendant's 
Motion to Vacate and set aside the Default Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an Order vacating the Default Judg-
ment entered against him. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts out of which this case arises are that 
on or about October 12, 1978, at or near Harrison Boulevard 
and 3400 South Street, defendant-appellant and plaintiff-
respondent were involved in an automobile accident. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Respondent claims that he sustained injuries in 
the October 12, 1978 accident and medical expenses and a 
loss of earnings. 
On April 15, 1979, respondent was again involved 
in an automobile accident with a non-party to this action by 
the name of Wendy Meenderink. The respondent in a separate 
claim against Wendy Meenderink has claimed he sustained 
injuries in the April 15, 1979 accident and has incurred 
medical expenses and has lost earnings due to said injuries. 
Coincidentally, both claims made by respondent 
Helgesen were referred to Allstate Insurance Company, the 
insurer for both appellant and Wendy Meenderink. 
Plaintiff thereafter proceeded to negotiate settle-
ment of the two claims together with representatives of 
Allstate Insurance Company. When settlement was not accom-
plished, respondent filed Complaints, on November 16, 1979, 
against both appellant and W~ndy Meenderink. Allstate Insur-
ance Company also received, at that point in time, a courtesy 
copy of the suit papers with a cover letter from respondent's 
counsel suggesting that the matters were still open for 
settlement jointly in spite of the suits to be brought in the 
Second District Court. 
The record discloses that appellant was served 
with process on November 24, 1979 and·31 days thereafter a 
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default hearing was held before the Honorable Judge John F. 
Wahlquist. The Default Judgment was signed on December 31, 
1979. 
Although the suit was filed on the same day as the 
instant case, by plaintiff, was in default no action was 
taken by plaintiff-respondent towards default. 
On January 11, 1980 appellant, immediately after 
receiving notice of the entry of the default, filed his 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant's 
Motion was supported by an Answer, Affidavit and a Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities supporting the same. Appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside the Default was called up for hearing on 
March 3, 1980. The court conditionally denied appellant's 
Motion and granted appellant ten days to submit additional 
Affidavits. 
The additional Affidavits of the appellant and Mr. 
Charles Kent, an adjuster for Allstate, were filed on March 
12, 1980. At the court's own intitiative, a second hearing 
was held on defendant's Motion and again the court refused 
to grant the relief sought. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION UNDER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b). 
- 3 -
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Rule 60{b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just 
the court may, in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order or proceeding 
for the following reasons: 
• 
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect; 
(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); 
(3) Fraud, whether heretofore denominated 
extrinsic, misrepresentation or other con-
duct of an adverse party; 
(4) When, for any cause, the summons in the 
action has not been personally served upon 
the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and 
the defendant has failed to appear in said 
action; 
(5) The judgment is void; 
(6) The judgment has been satisfied, re-
leased or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equit-
able that the judgment should have prospec-
tive applications; or 
(7) Any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4) not more than 
three months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken .... 
The present case involves a rather simple yet 
understandable situation of confusion and mistake that was 
precipitated by months of negotiations between the respon-
dent's counsel and claims representatives of Allstate 
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Insurance Company. When all of the circumstances, shown 
by Affidavits in the _record, are examined together it is 
clear that the relief sought by appellant in the court below 
was erroneously denied contrary to the interests of fundamen-
tal fairness and efficiency and the denial was an abuse of 
• 
discretion. 
The underlying principle of Rule 60{b) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, is to balance the interests of the defen-
dant in having his day in court and being heard on the merits 
against plaintiff's interest in the finality of the judgment. 
A motion to vacate a default judgment, and 
particularly when timely filed, is to be 
treated to best serve the ends of justice 
and preserve to a litigant his day in court. 
It is said that the court must, in a proper 
case, upon such a motion, yield the proce-
dural exactitudes to the more basic rules of 
fundamental fairness. On the other hand, 
relief from a default judgment on the basis 
of equitable principles is to be granted 
only when the occasion demands it, or when 
the exercise of such power is necessary to 
prevent injustice. In any determination of 
whether a default judgment should be set 
aside the court is guided by equitable prin-
ciples requiring that a defendant be given 
a fair opportunity to litigate a disputed 
obligation, and also requiring that a plain-
tiff who has, according to regular legal 
proceedings, secured judgment, be protected 
against a violation of the rule which re-
quires the sanctity and security of a valid 
judgment. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgment §686. 
This court on various occasions has indicated its 
agreement with the position stated in the noted authority 
immediately above. In the recent case of Olsen v. Cummings, 
565 P.2d 1123 (1977), this court repeated its position as to 
vacation of Default Judgments: 
- 5 -
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Although a trial court is endowed with 
considerable latitude of discretion in 
granting or deny a motion to vacate a final 
judgment, it cannot act arbitrarily.· 
. • • It is quite uniformly regarded as an 
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear, and timely application 
is made to set it aside. (Quoting from 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 376 
P.2d 951, (1962)) 
Because an application to set aside a 
default is equitable in nature and is ad-
dressed to the conscience of the court, all 
of the attendant circumstances should be 
considered. Relief in doubtful cases gen-
erally will be granted so a party may have 
a hearing. See also Baird v. Intermountain 
School Federal Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877 
(Ut. 197 5). 
The scope of discretion of the trial court in the 
review of its exercise was discussed by this court in the 
recent case of Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (1976). In 
the Carmen case the trial court granted a Default Judgment 
against one of two defendants pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the defendant failed 
to appear at his deposition as ordered. This court's review 
of the facts pointed out that there had been some confusion 
in the defendant's relationship with his attorney, although 
service and notice of the deposition were not questioned. 
This court vacated the default, commenting on the trial 
court's discretion as follows: 
It is true that where the authority to 
perform a proposed action rests with the dis-
cretion of the court we must allow consider-
able latitude in which he may exercise his 
judgment. But this does not mean the court 
- 6 -
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has unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary 
manner fundamental to the concept of the rule 
of law is the principle that reason and jus-
tice shall prevail over the arbitrary and 
uncontrolled will of any one person; and that 
this applies to all men in every status: To 
courts and judges as well as to autocrats or 
bureaucrats. The meaning of the term 'dis-
cretion' itself imports that the action 
should be taken within the reason and good 
conscience in the interests of protecting 
the rights of both parties and serving the 
ends of justice. It always has been the 
policy our law to resolve doubt in favor of 
permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of a controversy. 546 
P.2d at 603. 
In an earlier decision, Kelly v. Scott, 5 Ut.2d 
159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956), this court also spoke concerning 
the discretion granted to a trial court in setting aside a 
Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 60{b). 
The following observation was made: 
Although this court has been reluctant to 
reverse a trial court on a decision not to 
vacate a default judgment and will not do 
so where it appears that all elements were 
considered, we have here the somewhat du-
bious advantage of viewing the entire con-
fused record and there appears to be no 
equities, other than the time involved, 
which mitigate against the rule that dis-
cretion must be exercised in the further-
ance of justice and that ordinarily the 
court should incline towards granting 
relief so that the matter might be heard 
on its merits. 298 P.2d at 823. 
In the instant case each and every criteria re-
quired for the relief sought from the default judgment has 
been satisfied. Accordingly, the trial court has abused its 
discretion in denying the defendant-appellant's Motion. In 
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particular, the Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered in this matter clearly demonstrate that the court 
below has misinterpreted the import of Rule 60{b) and incor-
rectly applied the controlling rule of law. 
The trial court found that (1) the defendant-
appellant had not presented the court with any substantial 
issue on the question of liability and (2) the reasons pre-
sented by the defendant-appellant for its failure to respond 
in a timely fashion to plaintiff's Complaint did not consti-
tute mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect justifying 
relief under Rule 60(b). 
The trial court has abused its discretion by going 
beyond the parameters of Rule 60(b) in that the trial court, 
instead of determining if justice required that the judgment 
be set aside due to the fact of mistake and inadvertence, 
has made a finding as to the sufficiency of the Affidavit 
I 
and reasoning proffered to support defendant's 60(b) Motion. 
A careful review of the Affidavit offered by defen-
dant, of Mr. Charles Kent, an adjuster for Allstate Insurance 
Company, clearly reveals that Mr. Kent was "mistaken" as to 
the intentions of plaintiff and his attorney because of a 
certain letter received by Allstate Insurance Company prior 
to the filing of the Complaint in this matter. Mr. Kent, by 
Affidavit, explains that he was responsible for the adjusting 
- 8 -
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of two separate claims being made by the plaintiff-respondent 
against two Allstate insureds, and additionally that con-
siderable negotiations entertained by plaintiff's counsel 
and himself relative to settlement. Mr. Kent, also by 
Affidavit, explains that plaintiff's counsel was insistent 
that the two claims be settled for one lump sum, which offer 
Mr. Kent continually rejected. The real confusion actually 
arose when on or about November 12, 1979 Mr. Kent received a 
letter from plaintiff's counsel, a copy of which is attached 
to Mr. Kent's Affidavit, in which plaintiff's attorney 
again offered that his client's claims be settled for the 
one payment of $18,000.00. Mr. Kent mistakenly understood 
Mr. Hasenyager's letter, coupled with the earlier negotiation 
conferences, to mean that plaintiff was still interested in 
effecting a settlement and there would be further contact 
and negotiation over the matter. The Complaint in this 
matter was not filed for several days after Mr. Kent received 
his courtesy copy of the Complaint, nor was the defendant-
appellant served for some time thereafter. The following 
language taken from Mr. Hasenyager's letter was the reason 
for Mr. Kent's misunderstanding and "mistake": 
Our efforts to settle these two cases for the 
sum of $18,000.00 will remain open through 
the 20 day period for answering the respec-
tive complaints, otherwise the cases will be 
tried. 
- 9 -
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Mr. Kent mistakenly understood Mr. Hasenyager's 
letter to indicate that the of fer would remain open "through" 
the particular time for answering the Complaint. Mr. Kent's 
interpretation of the term "through," whether reasonable or 
not, was that Mr. Hasenyager planned to file his Complaints 
and have the insureds served but that time for accepting the 
offer of settlement or answering the Complaints would remain 
open "beyond" the 20 days rather than "during" the 20 days 
for answering. Mr. Hasenyager, plaintiff's counsel, use of 
the term "through" is nebulous and ambiguous and in this 
case tended to create a confusion which resulted in the 
defendant-appellant's failure to respond prior to the entry 
of a Default Judgment. 
The court below after reviewing the Affidavit of 
Mr. Kent, which Affidavit was uncontroverted, found that the 
Affidavit was not sufficient to constitute mistake, inadver-
tence or inexcusable neglect. The very wording of the 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicates 
that the court seemingly has applied Rule 60(b)(l) with a 
qualifying factor to each of the particular criteria upon 
which relief can be granted. A careful review of 60(b) will 
find that only the criteria "neglect" is qualified by the 
term "excusable." The references to mistake or inadvertence 
are unqualified and do not require or allow a finding of the 
court as to whether the same are excusable, reasonable or 
justified. The term "mistake" in and of itself is not 
- 10 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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qualified as being excusable or not. Webster defines mistake 
as: 
1. An error caused by lack of skill, atten-
tion, knowledge, etc.; 
2. A misunderstanding or misconception; 
3. To regard or identify wrongly; 
4. To understand, interpret, or evaluate 
wrongly: misunderstand. 
Clearly Mr. Kent has indicated that the failure to 
respond was due to his mistake or misconception of what 
plaintiff was requiring of the defendant and its insurer. 
The affidavit of Mr. Kent recites the necessary underlying 
factual setting and thus mistake is shown. Mr. Kent clearly 
misunderstood the import of Mr. Hasenyager's, plaintiff's 
counsel, letter; for the court then to make a finding that 
Mr. Kent's Affidavit was not sufficient to constitute mis-
take is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. The 
dicta of this court in the case of Olsen v. Cummings, supra, 
is applicable in the instant case, quoting once again: 
• . • It is quite uniformly regarded as an 
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment when there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear and timely application is 
made to set it aside. 565 P.2d at 1124. 
The record will disclose that timely application 
was made by the defendant to have the e11try of judgment set 
aside. There is no dispute that application for the relief 
sought was timely made. 
- 11 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The second major issue for focus is whether the 
defendant has offered a meritorious defense to the claims 
made by the plaintiff in this action. It is recognized that 
the general rule of law in this state is that a party seeking 
to vacate a Default Judgment: 
. . • must proffer some defense of at 
least sufficient ostensible merit as would 
justify a trial of the issue thus raised. 
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corpora-
tion, 545 P.2d 507, (1976). 
It is defendant-appellant's contention that the 
court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
Default Judgment on the basis that the court had not been 
presented with any substantial issue on the question of 
liability. The affidavit offered by defendant~ Mr. 
Inyangumia, along with the Answer, including affirmative 
defenses contained therein, would have to be completely 
disregarded in order for the court to find that they had not 
been presented with any substantial issue on the question 
of liability. In the Downey State Bank case the trial 
court appropriately found that the defendant had failed to 
proffer any meritorious defense, or in fact any defense at 
all. Clearly, the Downey State Bank case is distinguishable 
f f . ' rom the instant action. A close review o Mr. Inyangumia s 
Affidavit will show that defendant contests plaintiff's 
claim on the question of liability and in fact asserts that 
the plaintiff himself was responsible for the collision in 
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question and the resulting injuries. Clearly the court be-
low has misapprehended the controlling rule of law. Under 
this state's Comparative Negligence Statute, Mr. Inyangumia's 
defense need not be a complete defense but need only rise to 
the level of a partial defense for which the trier could 
attribute a portion of the negligence to the plaintiff and a 
portion to the defendant. To completely disregard the 
Affidavit of Mr. Inyangumia, given to support the Answer and 
affirmative defenses proffered, is certainly an abuse of 
discretion of the court requiring that the Order of the 
trial court be reversed. 
Additionally, defendant-appellant has answered 
denying that the damages plaintiff alleges in his Complaint, 
if any, were proximately caused by the accident complained 
of in the instant case. Arguments presented by defendant 
pointed out to the court below that plaintiff had, prior to 
commencement of the action, been involved in a separate 
accident for which similar claims were being made for in-
juries. In spite of these definite issues as to damages the 
court refused to recognize defendant's proffer of meritor-
ious defenses. 
In balancing the equities in this matter it is 
imperative that some consideration be given as to the pre-
judice either party sl1all sustain should the Order of the 
trial court be reversed. It can be contemplated that the 
plaintiff-respondent will argue that the reopening of this 
- 13 -
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matter will greatly prejudice him inasmuch as he will now be 
obligated to go forward with his case and prove both the 
liability and damage aspects of his claim. The fallacy with 
this argument is that in each case where there has been a 
Default Judgment, ·the prejudice will always be the same, 
i.e., the non-defaulting party will then be required to 
litigate his claims on the merits. No party has contended 
that either the defendant or his insurer has willfully acted 
to cause or create the circumstances as they now exist. In 
balancing the equities then, the extreme hardship will be 
placed upon the defendant-appellant in this matter due to 
the fact that he is now foreclosed from trying his case on 
the merits. 
This court has recognized the extreme hardship 
that a substantial Default Judgment can involve and has 
stressed the liberality with which Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure should be applied in such cases. Utah Sand 
and Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Ut.2d 407, 402 P.2d 
703 (1965). In the Utah Sand case, plaintiff brought an 
action alleging in excess of $20,000.00 owing in Third Dis-
trict Court but served defendant with a Summons marked "City 
Court" whose jurisdictional limit was $1,000.00. Soon 
thereafter, on plaintiff's Motion, the Summons was amended 
to show the Third District Court and defendant was advised 
of the amendment by mail. No Answer was filed and Default 
Judgment was taken. Defendant's Motion to have the judgment 
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(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be 
entered as· follows: 
•.• (2) By the court: In all other cases 
the party entitled to a judgment by default 
shall apply to the court therefore. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment 
or to carry it into effect, it is necessary 
to take into account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth 
of any averment by evidence or to make an 
investigation of any other matter, the court 
may conduct such hearings or orders such 
references as it deems necessary and proper. 
It is clear from plaintiff's Complaint that in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment, it was necessary 
in order to determine the ·amount of damages to make an inves-
tigation, and receive appropriate and competent evidence. 
As is demonstrated in the transcription of the default 
hearing, the evidence offered was offered solely by the 
plaintiff himself, and no competent or admissible evidence 
was introduced as to the medical condition of the piaintiff. 
In addition, all testimony given by the plaintiff concerning 
his loss of earnings was totally conjectural and speculative 
based upon no supporting documentation or admissible testi-
mony. The evidence offered as to loss of earnings was as 
follows: 
Q Now, you have stated in your Complaint 
that the best estimate of the time lost and 
the wages lost for that time would be 
$800.00 a month. 
A Right. 
Q For two months, is that correct? 
A Yeah, that's right. 
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Q Now .•. 
A That's hard to judge because building 
houses for sale, speculation, and selling 
real estate are really. . • I don't have 
much to judge as a salary. 
The transcript of the default hearing held in this 
matter is demonstrative of the fact that the evidence prof-
fered was not sufficient "to determine the amount of damages 
or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence." 
Rule 55(b)(2). 
In a recent case entitled Pitts v. Pine Meadows 
Ranch, 589 P.2d 767 (Ut. 1978), this court dealt with a 
similar question concerning the damage issue. In the Pitts 
case, plaintiff sought recovery for trespass to real pro-
perty. At the time of granting the default, the trial court 
took evidence on damages but the record shows that the 
evidence of diminution of value in the value of the trees 
involved on the property was not sufficient and the court 
entered the large judgment only because the defendant had 
been dilatory in not responding to a lawsuit. This court 
upheld the validity of the default taken in the case but 
remanded pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for a hearing to establish damages. 
In the instant case, not only is the record devoid 
of any competent evidence or findings regarding damages but 
the Complaint, on_ its face, shows at a minimum the double 
recovery on the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff. 
The same relief sought by appellant has been granted in other 
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cases by this court. See J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Daniel 
W. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (1979). 
CONCLUSION 
Principles of fundamental fairness and equity have 
been violated when a party to an action, in good faith, 
mistakenly comprehends the intentions of an adverse party, 
which mistake ends in a Default Judgment in a sum in excess 
of $16,000.00. It was an abuse of discretion for the court 
below to deny the relief from the Default Judgment entered 
in this matter. 
The mistake in this matter is evidenced by the fact 
that plaintiff-respondent moved forward to default on the 
instant matter but took no action against the other Allstate 
insured, Wendy Meenderink, though that case was also in de-
fault. This case stands as a perfect example of a windfall 
where plaintiff-respondent has used the Rules of Procedure 
to obtain a judgment which would not have been granted by a 
jury sitting in this state. Plaintiff's counsel knew where 
to contact persons responsible to answer on behalf of the 
defendant, and though there was no legal obligation for him 
to do so, the fact that he had been negotiating with Mr. 
Charles Kent for some months prior to the actual filing of 
the Complaint placed upon plaintiff's counsel some degree of 
responsibility to equitably conclude the matter short of a 
windfall judgment. Plaintiff's counsel's offer of settlement 
which accompanied the courtesy copy of the Summons and 
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Complaint, now estoppes plaintiff from relying on the proce-
dural exactitudes of ·the rule. Again turning the court's 
attention to the record in this matter, it is shown that the 
court made inquiry of plaintiff's counsel why the defendant, 
or its insurer, had not responded. The following is taken 
from the transcipt of the record: 
The Court: I'm curious about why they did 
not appear. Was there some denial of cover-
age or something of this sort? 
Mr. Hasenyager: There has not been, your 
Honor. As a matter of fact, if I ••. 
Q. Mr. Helgesen, on August 3 of 1979, did 
you also go to Dr. Brewer for a second opin-
ion at the request of Allstate Insurance 
Company? 
A. Yes, I was requested by Allstate. 
Mre Hasenyager: I frankly don't know, and 
there is a bill being sent to Mr. Helgesen 
for $100.00 for Dr. Brewer's examination 
which was done at the request of Allstate 
Insurance Company. I do not know why they 
have not responded to this complaint. We 
filed it and they were sent. . • And I 
have a copy of my letter which I could sub-
mit to the court, which was sent to Allstate 
Insurance Company which included a copy of 
the complaint itself. We told them we were 
filing it and we had Mr. Inyangumia served 
on the 24th of November. There has been no 
.•. absolutely no response from either Mr. 
Inyangumia or the insurance company. 
The Court: Did you send them a copy of the 
memorandum which you filed? 
Mr. Hasenyager: I did not, your Honor. 
That was filed with the court I think about 
two days or so before Christmas .... Well, 
it would have last Thursday or Friday. 
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According to plaintiff's counsel's own admission, 
he did not know make any effort to contact Allstate. Appel-
lant recognizes that plaintiff had no legal obligation to do 
so but did have some equitable obligation because of the 
lengthy months of negotiation that had been undertaken to 
conclude this matter. Additionally, by plaintiff's coun-
sel's own statement in the record, he indicates that the 
Memorandum was filed several days before Christmas, 1979. 
This means that the Memorandum would have necessarily been 
prepared sometime prior to that or in other words, shortly 
after the time had run for answering. 
It is also perfectly clear that if the default 
were vacated, plaintiff would only suffer the inconvenience 
of a delay in having the matter resolved by a trier of fact. 
In view of the large sum and the injustice involved in this 
case, Rule 60(b) should be applied with great liberality. 
Defendant has met the standards for relief under such a 
liberal application and should be granted a vacation of the 
judgment. If this court were to hold otherwise, plaintiff 
will be in a windfall position while defendant will be denied 
a just hearing on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this /B day of July, 1980. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
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